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I. INTRODUCTION
As Justice Franklin D. Cleckley wrote ten years ago in his comprehen-
sive Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure, "[1litigants in West
Virginia deserve to know at the earliest moment the significant law of the fo-
rum" regarding the applicability of the Leon good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule in West Virginia.' Today, there is still no clear indication that West
Virginia will follow or reject the "good faith" defense. This note attempts to
once again call upon the Supreme Court of West Virginia to declare at its next
opportunity whether or not Leon applies in West Virginia.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 2 Fur-
ther, the Fourth Amendment imparts that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."3 In 1914, the
United States Supreme Court, in an effort to give substance to the rights guaran-
teed under the Fourth Amendment, introduced the exclusionary rule, a remedy
barring the introduction of evidence in a federal court secured through an illegal
search. In 1961, the Court, in Mapp v. Ohio,5 extended the exclusionary rule to
the states in an effort to give meaning to the incorporation of the Fourth
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. After a gradual erosion of the
breadth of the application of the exclusionary rule, the Court established the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.6
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule would not
bar the admission of evidence when police obtained a search warrant from a
I FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 228-29
(1993). Justice Cleckley is the Arthur D. Hodges Professor of Law at the West Virginia Univer-
sity College of Law (1969-present) and honorably served as Associate Justice for the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 Id.
4 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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judicial officer later determined invalid but relied upon in good faith. Since its
adoption, the good faith exception has received immense ridicule by state
courts, federal judges, legal commentators and civil rights activists. Indeed,
numerous state courts have rejected the good faith exception and the Supreme
Court's analysis of the exclusionary rule in Leon. In reaction to concerns that
the good faith exception undermines Fourth Amendment protections, many state
courts have refused to adopt the good faith exception on state constitutional
grounds. However, many other state courts have upheld the Supreme Court's
good faith exception, determining that the states' protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures and the exclusionary rule should be read consistently
with federal law. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has refused to
either reject or adopt the good faith exception as a matter of state law.
This note addresses the significance of the good faith exception in
criminal procedure jurisprudence. Part H1 traces the historical and substantive
analysis of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Part HI
examines the United States Supreme Court's establishment of the exclusionary
rule. Parts IV, V and VI address the United States Supreme Court's adoption of
the good faith exception and the Court's analysis of the good faith exception
since Leon. Part VII analyzes the divergent state court interpretations of the
good faith exception. Finally, Part VIII provides a brief historical review of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' analysis of search and seizure law
and argues that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should either adopt
or reject the good faith exception. The author's intention is to beckon the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to declare the law in West Virginia at the
earliest instance so as to put law enforcement, the judiciary, the state bar, and
state citizens on notice concerning the law of the State of West Virginia on this
significant issue.
II. HISTORICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. History of Searches, Seizures and Warrants
"The inception of legally authorized search and seizure is shrouded in
the semi-obscurity of the early English common law."7 Indeed, the history of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is steeped in
"free speech, tax collection, smuggling, corruption, politics, and, much later,
litigation."8 "Warrants emerged in England during the early 1300s." 9 Issued by
7 EDWARD C. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 2 (1970).
8 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 (2d ed. 1993); see also JABOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 30-48 (1966); NELSON B. LASSON,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 13-20 (1937).
9 KRIS E. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 1789 TO THE PRESENT 70 (2000).
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the king and referred to as "general warrants,"10 these warrants gave the king's
agents broad search powers as to extent and time, generally enduring until the
death of the king.'1
As general warrants became increasingly used to authorize search and
seizures to enforce import duty laws and seize smuggled goods, the developing
English common law struggled with little success to impose limits on the expan-
sive government power to search. 12 Indeed, by the commencement of the seven-
teenth century, English magistrates possessed the power to question anyone and
"search all suspected places for papers of a threatening political nature."'13 How-
ever, the mounting exploitation of general warrants was not limited to England.
The English Parliament, in an effort to enforce various trade restrictions on the
American colonies, also granted American customs officers the same powers of
search and seizure by way of general search warrants that came to be known as
"writs of assistance. 1 4 Through the extreme generality of their scope, writs of
assistance were intrusive and abused. 15 Resentment against the rigorous use of
the writs of assistance grew and various challenges ensued, both in England and
in the American colonies, regarding the extraordinary power of the king's agents
and American officers to search.
16
In Entick v. Carrington,7 Lord Camden found a general warrant invalid
and void, holding that "[t]his is the first instance of an attempt to prove a mod-
em practice of a private office to make and execute warrants to enter a man's
house, search for and take away all his books and papers in the first instance, to
be law, which is not to be found in our books."' 8 Not only did Lord Camden
find the warrants lacking probable cause and too general, he declared the overly
broad power of the English government was "contrary to the genius of the law
of England."' 19
Around the same period of the English attacks on the Crown's search
and seizure practices, colonial intolerance for the writs of assistance mounted.
10 General warrants were issued under the government's authority and permitted "invasions of
the home and privacy of the citizens and the seizure of their private papers in support of charges,
real or imaginary, made against them." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
1 PALMER, supra note 9, at 70.
12 See 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 5.
13 PALMER, supra note 9, at 70.
14 See id. at 72. The writs of assistance commanded all officers and subjects of the Crown to
assist in their execution, thereby fashioning their name. Id.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 72-73.
17 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
18 Id. at 818.
19 Id. at 812.
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Colonists in general, and merchants in particular, deplored not only the eco-
nomic hindrance of the writs issued to colonial customs officials but also the
manner in which the writs were carried out. Facing a new issuance of writs fol-
lowing the death of King George II in 1760, colonists turned to the colonial
court system to oppose the new writs.20 In Paxton's Case,2' several Boston
merchants denounced the writs and argued for a more just form of warrants,
specifying homes to be searched and particular evidence to be seized.22 Al-
though the merchants lost the challenge, the arguments set forth by the mer-
chants and colonists inspired resistance and formed a "mosaic of rebellion,"
leading to widespread interference with the execution of writs and signaling
steps toward an outcry for independence.23 The colonists' disdain for the writs
of assistance was so immense, that, on the eve of the publication of the Declara-
tion of Independence, "John Adams cited the broad British law enforcement
powers as 'the commencement of the controversy between Great Britain and
America.'24
After the American Revolutionary War and leading up to the Constitu-
tional Convention, several states enacted protection against unreasonable
25
searches and seizures. State constitutional provisions attempting to regulate
searches and seizures included requirements of oath or affirmation and phrases
such as "unreasonable searches and seizures. 26 Once the Constitution was rati-
fied and George Washington was inaugurated, the founders began work on the
Bill of Rights, previously guaranteed to the states upon ratification of the Con-
stitution. Although other constitutional amendments were hotly debated and
contested, the Fourth Amendment was generally well received.27 Submitted by
Congress to the states on September 25, 1789 and ratified by the required three-
fourths of the states, the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was
declared part of the Constitution on December 25, 1791.
20 See PALMER, supra note 9, at 72.
21 See Quincy's Reports 51-57 (1761).
22 See id; see also PALMER, supra note 9, at 72.
23 See PALMER, supra note 9, at 73.
24 Id. at 68.
25 See 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 12.
26 See LASSON, supra note 8, at 79-81. The Virginia Constitution, adopted three weeks prior
to the Declaration of Independence, was the first state to ensure some protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures. Id. at 79. Massachusetts, in 1780, was the first state to use the phrase
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 82.
27 See id. at 68. "During debate over the Bill of Rights, the Founders sought to protect the new
republic from the evils it had recently suffered under heavy-handed rule." Id. Pervasive through-
out adoption of the Bill of Rights was the Founders' conception of civil liberties, control of the
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B. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
Resistance to the invasions under the general warrant system in England
and the writs of assistance in the American colonies "established the principle
which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a
man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to
search and seize his goods and papers. 2 8 The "fundamental law" of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States imparts: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
Recognizing the innate confusion these words have created throughout
the era of American jurisprudence, Justice Frankfurter said of the Fourth
Amendment, "[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures ...
has not - to put it mildly - run smooth. 3° While substantive analysis of the
Fourth Amendment has been the source of immense litigation for over 200
years, the words of the Amendment do provide a starting point in analysis of the
Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, and, specifically, the good faith ex-
ception.
Although the extent of its protections and prohibitions are, to say the
least, arguable, the Fourth Amendment clearly proscribes "unreasonable
searches and seizures" of "persons, houses, papers and effects." 31 Specifically,
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 32 Moreover, the Fourth
Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of government
intrusion. ' 33 Understanding what constitutes a search and a seizure, and when
these acts may be considered unreasonable is required prior to further analysis
of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.
Searches and seizures are discrete acts. The Fourth Amendment and the
West Virginia Constitution provide that no unreasonable search or seizure shall
be made. 34 All unlawful searches and seizures are "per se" unreasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the relevant state provision.35 Thus,
28 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). For a general description of the origins
of the Fourth Amendment and its purposes, see id. at 389-91.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
33 Id. at 350.
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; W. VA. CONST. art. HI, § 6; see also State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d
50 (W. Va. 1980) (finding the West Virginia Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Julius, 408 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1991).
35 See State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1922).
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"unreasonable" usually refers to those acts that are unlawful or prohibited under
the Fourth Amendment.
1. What Is a "Search"?
A search is "[a]n examination of a person's body, property, or other area
that a person would reasonably be expected to consider as private, conducted by
a law-enforcement officer for the purpose of finding evidence of a crime. 36
Early on, the Supreme Court stated that a search entails an intrusive "quest by
an officer of the law. 37 However, in Katz v. United States,38 the Supreme Court
formulated the "expectation of privacy" standard, and has since maintained that,
in order for a search to occur, the government must intrude on a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy. 39  Moreover, a government's intrusion upon a justified
expectation of privacy, regardless of the "presence or absence of a physical in-
trusion into any given enclosure," also constitutes a search.4° West Virginia's
definition of a search is in accord with the Supreme Court's "expectation of
privacy" standard. An expectation of privacy is a prerequisite to a search; thus,
a court cannot find an unreasonable search if a person cannot first reasonably
expect privacy.4'
2. What Is a "Seizure"?
A seizure constitutes "[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of
property by legal right or process .... a confiscation or arrest that may interfere
with a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. ' '42 A seizure of property oc-
curs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's posses-
sory interests in that property. 'A3 The common definition of seizure of a person
36 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (7th ed. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary also provides a
comprehensive inventory of specific sorts of searches with accompanying definitions. See id. at
1351-52.
37 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397 (1914) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906)).
38 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39 See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
40 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (rejecting the view previously held in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941), that the absence of physical
penetration into the place being searched foreclosed further Fourth Amendment inquiry); see also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984) (finding whether a trespass has occurred is not
required to prove a violation of one's expectation of privacy but may serve as "marginally relevant
to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated").
41 Wagner v. Hedrick, 383 S.E.2d 286, 291 (W. Va. 1989).
42 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (7th ed. 1999).
43 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also Soldal v. Cook County, 506
20031
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in the context of the Fourth Amendment is meaningful interference, however
brief, with an individual's freedom of movement. 44
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Development of the Exclusionary Rule
At common law, "the manner in which evidence was obtained did not
affect its admissibility. ''4 The Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States, cre-
ated the exclusionary rule to redress the admission of evidence seized illegally
by federal agents and offered in federal court.46 However, after Weeks, under
the "silver platter doctrine, '47 evidence unlawfully seized by state agents and
turned over to federal agents could be used in federal courts.48 Twenty-one
years later, the Supreme Court rejected the "silver platter doctrine" in Elkins v.
United States,49 holding that "no distinction can logically be drawn between
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that obtained in
violation of the Fourteenth., 50 As the federal system increasingly approved and
accepted the exclusionary rule and as states individually adopted the exclusion-
ary rule,5' the adoption of the exclusionary rule in state prosecutions seemed
inevitable. In Mapp v. Ohio,52 in 1961, the Supreme Court, in overruling Wolf v.
U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (concluding that as a result of the Cook County Sheriff's Department hooking
the home to a tractor, "the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away,
giving new meaning to the term 'mobile home"')
44 See 1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 204; see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112; Macon, 472 U.S.
at 463 (applying definitions of search and seizure within the context of Jacobsen); Karo, 468 U.S.
at 705.
45 1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 205. Other methods of redress, such as a right of action
against the perpetrator of the illegal search, proved futile and provided no deterrent to government
agents. Id. at 206; see also Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
46 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
47 Under the "silver platter doctrine," the federal government could use the fruits of an illegal
search or seizure conducted by state officials. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
48 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); see also 1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 206.
49 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
50 Id. at 215. In Elkins, the Supreme Court cited Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), in
which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment had been incorporated into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby finding that Wolf removed the doctrinal foundation
of the "silver platter rule." Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213. The holding of Elkins was limited, in that
evidence seized by state officers could not be used in federal courts. Id.
51 See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) ("Experience has demonstrated . . .that
neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches
and seizures.").
52 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). In Mapp, the
Supreme Court of Ohio refused to suppress illegally seized evidence, citing the Court's refusal to
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Colorado,53 extended the exclusionary rule to the states and held that "all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is...
inadmissible in a state court. '5 4 The basis of the Court's incorporation of the
exclusionary rule to the states was threefold: 1) Most states were applying the
exclusionary rule; 2) If states could use the evidence seized then the incorpora-
tion of the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless; and 3) To hold otherwise
would invite anarchy.
55
B. Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule
Rights delegated to the people of the United States under the Constitu-
tion presumably entail some remedy for their violation. However, the Fourth
Amendment does not explicitly or implicitly provide a remedy for the violation
of a Fourth Amendment right.56 The Supreme Court has interpreted the text of
the Fourth Amendment and ultimately concluded that an exclusionary rule is the
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.57 The exclusionary rule is a remedy
"to give substance and meaning to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 58 From 1790, when the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted, until Weeks in 1914, there was no rule excluding illegally
seized evidence.59 The Supreme Court has applied various rationales for the
exclusionary rule.60 Indeed, since 1914 the Court's rationale for the exclusion-
ary rule has evolved from its basis of judicial integrity and personal rights in
Weeks,61 to police deterrence in Wolf v. Colorado,62 to police deterrence and
selectively incorporate the exclusionary rule to the states in Wolf. Id. at 645-46. In Wolf, although
the Supreme Court applied the security against unreasonable searches and seizures to the states via
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it gave the states the discretion in adopting
any method to deter unreasonable searches and seizures. See 1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 207.
53 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
54 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
55 Id. at 655-60.
56 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
57 Id.
58 See 1 HALL, supra note, at 143.
59 Courts throughout this period, almost uniformly, did not inquire into the methods of obtain-
ing evidence; thus, the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of the means
through which a party obtained the evidence. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467-69
(1928). The first effort to suppress evidence obtained via an illegal search and seizure in the Su-
preme Court came in 1904 in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). The Court upheld the
admission of the evidence asserting that "the courts do not stop to inquire as to the means by
which the evidence was obtained." Id. at 594-95.
60 See generally Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusion-
ary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
61 See 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 144-49. This author would argue that a deterrence rationale
2003]
9
Nelson: An Appeal in Good Faith: Does the Leon Good Faith Exception to th
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
judicial integrity in Elkins v. United States63 and Mapp v. Ohio,64 and finally, to
total reliance on the deterrence rationale in United States v. Leon.65
C. Rationale for the Application of the Exclusionary Rule
In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court evidenced its intent to
protect citizens' Fourth Amendment rights when it held, "[I]f letters and private
documents can thus be [illegally] seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value."66 Sup-
porting this proposition, the Court then noted that "[tihe efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of en-
deavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamen-
tal law of the land.,
67
The Court first introduced the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule in Wolf v. Colorado68 in 1949. The assumption of the deterrence rationale
is that police are less likely to perform illegal searches and seizures if the exclu-
sionary rule will be applied to the illegally seized evidence in the subsequent
trial. Indeed, the deterrence rationale was used in repudiating the "silver platter
doctrine" in Elkins v. United States,69 when the Court described the purpose of
the exclusionary rule "to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it."7°
In Mapp v. Ohio,71 the Supreme Court supplied two justifications for the
extension of the exclusionary rule to the states: to deter the disregard of the
rights inherent in the Fourth Amendment and to preserve judicial integrity.72
was a consideration and concern in the Supreme Court's creation of the exclusionary rule in
Weeks.
62 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
63 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
64 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
66 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
67 Id.
68 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
69 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
70 Id. at 217; see 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 156.
71 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72 Id. at 658-60.
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First, the Court emphasized the deterrence rationale as articulated by Elkins.73
The Court recognized that by not adopting an exclusionary remedy, states en-
couraged police misconduct and violations of citizen's Fourth Amendment
rights. Thus, "by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, [states] serve to en-
courage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold.,
74
Just as criminal penalties likely deter many from committing violations of
criminal laws, the Court reasoned the exclusionary rule may also deter police
officers and others from violating constitutional rights if they know that illegally
seized evidence will not be admitted in subsequent criminal trials.
75
A second justification for the exclusionary rule detailed in Mapp was
"the imperative of judicial integrity., 76 The Court noted that, although criminals
may inevitably go free as a result of the suppression of illegally seized evidence,
"it is the law that sets him free. ' 77 To fetter anarchy and the abandonment of its
own existence, the government must obey its own laws to avoid the destruction
of "the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest.
78
Since Mapp, the efficacy of the deterrence rationale has been the subject
of debate.79 In United States v. Calandra,80 the Court examined whether deter-
rence was served by the application of the exclusionary rule.81 In engaging in a
cost-benefit analysis of exclusion and holding that the exclusionary rule would
not be extended to grand jury proceedings, Justice Powell wrote, "We therefore
decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly
minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of sub-
stantially impeding the role of the grand jury. '82 Questioning the deterrence
rationale's effect and conception, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Calandra,
found the purpose of deterrence "was at best only a hoped-for effect .... In-
deed, there is no evidence that the possible deterrent effect of the rule was given
any attention by the judges chiefly responsible for its formulation." 83 Nonethe-
73 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 660.
79 See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
80 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
81 See id.; see 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 157.
82 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351-52.
83 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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less, "Calandra marks the demise of the judicial integrity rationale and the rise
of deterrence as the primary modem justification for the exclusionary rule." 84
The Rehnquist Court's de-emphasis of the judicial integrity justification
of the exclusionary rule indicates that the deterrence rationale has become the
primary justification for the exclusionary rule. 85 The Court even held that the
preservation of judicial integrity has only a "limited role ... in the determina-
tion whether to apply the [exclusionary] rule in a particular context. ' ' 86 The
Court now generally maintains that deterrence is the "'prime purpose' of the
rule, if not the sole one.",87
D. Restrictions and Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Like many judicially created rules or remedies, the exclusionary rule,
since its inception, has been restricted to those areas where the rule's objectives
may be accomplished.88 Generally, absent other exceptions, only evidence
unlawfully seized in searches conducted in a government capacity is inadmissi-
ble per the exclusionary rule.89 Thus, evidence unlawfully seized by an individ-
ual acting in a private capacity is not within the scope of the exclusionary rule.90
The Court has limited the exclusionary rule's application to criminal trials in
which the issue is guilt or innocence, thereby excluding its applicability to grand
jury proceedings9' and habeas corpus proceedings. 92 Similarly, the Court has
restricted the exclusionary rule's application in federal civil proceedings. 93 In
84 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 160.
85 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
86 Id. at 485.
87 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347).
88 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). As discussed before, the exclusionary
rule's objectives are subject to immense debate.
89 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
90 Id.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see also Comment, Seizures by
Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REV. 608 (1967).
91 See Calandra, 414 U.S. 338. In Calandra, the Supreme Court declined to allow grand jury
witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from unlawful search or sei-
zures. Applying a balancing test, the Court held, "[any incremental deterrent effect which might
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best." Id. at 351.
92 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-88 (1976). In Powell, the Court emphasized that apply-
ing the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings would not reduce the rule's deter-
rent effect or government's interest in promoting judicial integrity. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 909 (1984), cited Powell as holding, "a state prisoner who has been afforded a full and
fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the
ground that unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial."
93 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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United States v. Janis,94 the Court permitted the use of illegally seized evidence
in state civil proceedings because the deterrent effect on police misconduct had
already been served through exclusion in the state criminal trial and further de-
terrence could not outweigh the substantial social costs of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in a tax proceeding.95
Other restrictions placed upon the application of the exclusionary rule
include the standing requirement and the use of illegally seized evidence for
purposes of impeachment. 96  In Rakas v. Illinois,97 the Court pronounced a
standing requirement in which the exclusionary rule could only be applied to
cases in which the fruits of the illegal search or seizure are used against the vic-
tim of the police misconduct. In United States v. Havens,98 evidence otherwise
inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief was deemed admissible to impeach
statements through cross-examination made by a defendant during the defen-
dant's direct examination.
The Court has also applied several doctrines prescribing the reach and
extent to which the exclusionary rule may be applied. Some of the significant
doctrines in exclusionary rule analysis include the poisonous tree doctrine,99 the
independent source doctrine,' °° the causal relationship requirement,' 10 and the
inevitable discovery rule. 02 Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this
note, in 1984, the Supreme Court fashioned the good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the introduction of evidence obtained by a
police officer acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that subsequently
94 Id.
95 Id. at 453-55.
96 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
97 Id.
98 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
99 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). According to the "poisonous tree doctrine,"
evidence later discovered and found derivative of an illegal search or seizure is subject to the
exclusionary rule. Id. at 804; see also State v. Goodmon, 290 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981).
100 State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981). Evidence that is subject to the exclusion-
ary rule may, nevertheless, be admitted if an independent source of the discovery of the evidence
existed. See United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1991).
101 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, the Court found a
statement otherwise subject to the exclusionary rule had become sufficiently attenuated from the
illegality to dissipate the taint. For evidence to be excluded, "there must be a causal relationship
between the particular violation and the discovery of the evidence sought to be excluded." 1
CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 210.
102 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). In adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine,
the Supreme Court held, "If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.. . then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received." Id. at 444.
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is determined invalid. 0 3 The Court justified its creation of the exclusionary rule
by emphasizing the deterrence rationale in calculating the social costs of imple-
menting the rule where police reasonably act within the perimeters of the Fourth
Amendment.l04
E. The Warrant Process
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized a constitutional prefer-
ence for the warrant.10 5 Indeed, the second portion of the Fourth Amendment, in
what is often referred to as the "warrant clause," 10 6 states, "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.' 0 7 Generally, before a government agent can conduct a search or sei-
zure, he must present an affidavit to obtain a warrant from a magistrate to de-
termine whether he has adequate grounds to conduct the search or seizure. Once
a warrant is approved and signed by the judge, the officer may execute the war-
rant.
To determine the sufficiency and validity of the warrant and the reason-
ableness of the search or seizure, the Court and, to some extent, the Fourth
Amendment requires that the warrant be based on probable cause, 10 8 supported
103 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
104 Id. at 906-08.
105 Id. at 914; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
106 The first clause of the Fourth Amendment, providing "the right of the people to be secure
... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," is referred to as the "rea-
sonableness clause." The relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment is sub-
ject to immense controversy. Generally, there are two schools of thought concerning the correla-
tion between the two clauses. One analysis of the clauses is that the two clauses are linked, in
that, "the Warrant Clause defines and interprets the Reasonableness Clause." Tracey Maclin,
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20
(1994). A warrant is always required in order to conduct any search and seizure following this
interpretation. Indeed, in endorsing this view, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment... " Id. at 357.
Alternatively, the other school of thought maintains that search warrants are not constitutionally
required. Accordingly, the two clauses are considered independent of each other; that is, the "rea-
sonableness clause" only requires that the search or seizure be reasonable, and the "warrant
clause" details when warrants shall not be issued. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1994).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
108 "Probable cause" is generally defined as a sufficient quantum of evidence to convince a
reasonable person that a crime has been committed and the fruits of the crime are likely to be
present. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (7th ed. 1999); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Probable cause is also determined, in situations
where the probable cause is based on an informant's tip, via a "totality of the circumstances" test.
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by an "Oath or affirmation," 109 a particular description of the objects to be
searched and/or seized,"10 and that the magistrate issuing the warrant be neutral
and detached."' Over time, the Court's test for sufficiency and validity of war-
rants has changed.
In Aguilar v. Texas"l2 and Spinelli v. United States,"t3 the Court origi-
nally developed a two-prong test (otherwise known as the "basis of knowledge"
and the "veracity" prongs) to describe how hearsay involving an informant's tip
used as probable cause should be evaluated. Before Aguilar, a warrant could
not be issued where the existence of probable cause was based upon a conclu-
sory affidavit or mere suspicion. 14 In Jones v. United States,1 5 hearsay was
sufficient to serve as the basis for the warrant "so long as a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay is presented." ' 1 6 Under Aguilar, the search warrant must
show the informant's "basis of knowledge" and must contain information so the
magistrate can determine the informant's veracity by showing the informant's
credibility or reliability.' 7 In Spinelli, the Court allowed corroborating informa-
tion to support the informant's story." 
8
The second test utilized by the Court in determining the validity of an
affidavit to obtain a search warrant was adopted in Illinois v. Gates."l9 The
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Indeed, under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause
must be shown before a search warrant may be issued. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655
(1979).
109 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
110 The Fourth Amendment provides that warrants must "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. The test to determine the specificity, or
particularity of the place to be searched, is that the place should be so specified that it is evident to
a third party officer what exact location is to be searched. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,
503 (1925).
III See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In addition to being neutral and de-
tached, the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant must not be a "rubber stamp for the police."
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111
(1964)).
112 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
113 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
1'4 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); see also Syl., State v. Greer, 42 S.E.2d 719
(W. Va. 1947) ("A search warrant based upon a statement in a complaint under oath that affiant
'has reasonable and just cause to suspect, and does suspect' that certain stolen property is con-
cealed in the premises described, is not issued upon probable cause as is required by Section 6 of
Article I of our Constitution and is therefore void.").
115 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
116 Id. at 269.
117 See id.
I18 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417.
119 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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growing complexity of the two-prong framework to determine probable cause
prompted the Court in Gates to adopt the "totality of the circumstances" test.12
0
The Court held the reliability and veracity elements of the informants tip "are all
highly relevant in determining the value of his report" and that "these elements
should [not] be understood as entirely separate and independent require-
ments.",21
The warrant process is critical in determining the existence of probable
cause that justifies the issuance of a search warrant. Because the fruits of a
search conducted pursuant to a warrant lacking probable cause are subject to
exclusion per the exclusionary rule, police and judges must find sufficient prob-
able cause to ensure the admissibility of crucial evidence seized in a search.
At times, however, a warrant issued by a magistrate or judge and exe-
cuted by the police in reasonable reliance of the magistrate's determination of its
validity is subsequently held invalid. In this situation the question becomes,
"Does the exclusionary rule prohibit the introduction of evidence seized via a
warrant subsequently determined invalid?" In United States v. Leon,122 the
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the introduction of the evi-
dence obtained where the police officer conducting the search acted in reason-
able reliance on a warrant that is subsequently found to be invalid.
IV. UNITED STATES V. LEON AND THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
1 23
Leon is perhaps the most disregarded Supreme Court decision from the
Rehnquist court. At issue in Leon was whether the exclusionary rule, as applied
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, should be modified
so as to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reli-
ance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ulti-
mately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 124 Indeed, much of the
Court's opinion in Leon is critical of the exclusionary rule, focusing on the so-
cial costs of its application. Perhaps, most importantly, the Court, in concluding
that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of the
120 Id. at 238.
121 Id. at 230.
122 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
123 In fact, the Supreme Court had already adopted the good faith exception to constitutional
violations. See 1 HALL, supra note 8, 178-79. In one example, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974), the Court upheld a pre-Miranda confession because the officers acted in good faith in
failing to comply with Miranda. Id. at 447. In finding the officers acted in good faith, the Court,
in turn, held "the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] loses much of its force." Id.; see
also Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). The De Fillippo Court, in declining to suppress
evidence obtained pursuant to a search incident to an arrest made under a supposedly valid ordi-
nance later held unconstitutional, held the officer was not "required to anticipate that a court
would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional." Id. at 38.
124 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
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Fourth Amendment, 25 found additional ammunition to narrow the scope of the
rule. Thus, rooted in the belief that there is insufficient justification to apply the
exclusionary rule in such a case, the Court created the good faith exception,
holding that "the exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopard-
izing its ability to perform its intended functions.' 26
A. Facts and Procedural History
Based on information provided to the Burbank, California police de-
partment by a confidential informant of unproven reliability, the Burbank Police
instigated an extensive investigation of two individuals, Armando Sanchez and
Patsy Stewart, concerning the distribution of large quantities of drugs. 27 During
the investigation, the police witnessed Ricardo Del Castillo arrive at and leave
the other individuals' residence with a small paper sack. 128 Del Castillo's proba-
tion records indicated that Alberto Leon was a former employer of Del Casti-
11o.129 Leon, with a history of previous drug charges, became a focus of the in-
vestigation after the Burbank police learned another informant had told the
Glendale, California police that Leon stored large quantities of drugs at his resi-
dence in Glendale. 30  Later in the investigation, the police observed several
individuals arrive at the homes of Sanchez, Stewart, and Del Castillo, and leave
with small packages in hand. 3'
Based on these and other observations, Officer Cyril Rombach of the
Burbank Police Department prepared an application for a warrant to search the
residences and automobiles of Sanchez, Stewart, Del Castillo and Leon for an
extensive list of items related to drug-trafficking activities.' 32 After several dep-
uty district attorneys reviewed the officer's warrant application, "a facially valid
search warrant was issued in September of 1981 by a State Superior Court
Judge.', 133 The "ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs"'' 34 and
other evidence relating to the trafficking of drugs, resulting in a grand jury in-
125 Id. at 905-06; see also id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (remarking that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is not based on the Constitution, but on deterrence of unconstitutional police
practices).
126 See id. at 905.
127 Id. at 901.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 901-02.
131 Id.
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dictment of "conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of sub-
stantive counts" against all the above mentioned individuals.' 35
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the defen-
dants' motions to suppress, in part,136 the evidence seized pursuant to the war-
rant, concluding that the affidavit prepared by Officer Rombach was "insuffi-
cient to establish probable cause.' 37 However, in rejecting the prosecution's
argument that the exclusionary rule should not apply where the police seized
evidence in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant, the court did
acknowledge that Officer Rombach acted in good faith. 138 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court order, concluding that the
affidavit did not establish probable cause because the information provided by
the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the two-part test established
in Aguilar v. Texas' 39 and Spinelli v. United States. 40 In the Government's peti-
tion for certiorari, it expressly declined to challenge the District Court's findings
that the search warrant lacked probable cause, and only presented the question
"whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not
to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a
search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.' 14 1
B. Social Concerns of the Majority Regarding the Exclusionary Rule
The majority in Leon,142 in finding that the exclusionary rule is not a
"necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment,"'' 43 or perhaps even constitu-
135 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902 (1984).
136 Id. at 903. The district court declined to suppress all of the evidence on the basis that none
of the defendants had standing to challenge all of the searches. Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 903-04. The finding of good faith by the district court doubtlessly made this case an
ideal one in which the government could argue for the adoption of a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.
139 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
140 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a court determines probable cause
derived from information from an informant by testing the informant's veracity. The test inquires
into the informant's credibility or reliability, and how the informant acquired the information.
Incidentally, the Supreme Court, in the term before hearing United States v. Leon, abandoned the
Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), substituting a
"totality of the circumstances" test.
141 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
142 Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Blackmun, Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun also
delivered a concurring opinion. See id. at 927. Justice Brennan entered a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Marshall joined. See id. at 928. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
See id. at 960.
143 Id. at 905-06 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 655-57 (1961); Olmstead v. United
[Vol. 105
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss3/11
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
tionally required, first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment "has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons."' 44 In so doing, the Court held that whether
the suppression of evidence via the exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in
a particular question is a separate question from whether the Fourth Amendment
was violated.1 45 The Court held, that the former question "must be resolved by
weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case-
in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is
found to be defective."
'' 46
The Court continued its balancing of the costs and benefits of applying
the exclusionary rule in such a case by evaluating its concern of the "substantial
social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights."' 47 First, the Court recognized that an unfortunate and natu-
ral consequence of the exclusionary rule's application is that some guilty defen-
dants go free where the courts apply such an "interference with the criminal
justice system's truth-finding function.' 48 Indeed, the Court identified that
when officers act in good faith, "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such
guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system."'' 49 The
Court, finding that the exclusionary rule had been "restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives [were] thought most efficaciously served,"'' 50 in
essence, held the penalty inflicted by a Fourth Amendment violation is often
disproportionate to the wrong. As a result, the Court laid a foundation for an
exception, holding that an "indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule..
. may well 'generate disrespect for the law and administration of justice." 5'
States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925)).
144 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486 (1976)).
145 Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
146 Id. at 906-07.
147 Id. at 907-08.
148 Id. at 907.
149 Id. at 908 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 490).
150 Id. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)); see also Stone,
428 U.S. at 486-87; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976).
151 Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 491).
2003]
19
Nelson: An Appeal in Good Faith: Does the Leon Good Faith Exception to th
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
C. The Court's Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule, Its Purpose, and the
Rule's Effect on Magistrates and Judges
The Leon Court, in defining the scope of the exclusionary rule, assessed
numerous Supreme Court decisions in which the Court had either failed to ex-
tend the reach of the exclusionary rule or enlisted exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. In doing so, the Court attempted to weaken the impact and scope of the
exclusionary rule in order to justify its creation of the good faith exception. The
Court first noted the exclusionary rule's inapplicability in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings,152 grand jury proceedings,153 federal civil proceedings, 154 and evidence
unlawfully seized from co-defendants or others against a defendant.155 Next, the
Court addressed circumstances in which it had held evidence generally inadmis-
sible under the exclusionary rule. For example, "evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief
may be used to impeach a defendant's direct testimony."'' 56 Moreover, the Court
noted that it declined to adopt a per se inadmissibility rule that would exclude
all evidence discovered through a chain of causation begun via an illegal ar-
rest.
The Court's use of a balancing test considering the costs and benefits of
the application of the exclusionary rule was key in the Court's restrictions of the
rule's application, and ultimately provided "strong support" for the Court's
adoption of the good faith modification. Acknowledging the Court's preference
for warrants, 5 8 the Court detailed three circumstances where it had inquired into
the warrant process and ultimately excluded evidence unconstitutionally
seized. 59 However, the Court acknowledged its failure to set forth a rationale
for suppressing evidence in two of these circumstances in which the errors were
concededly committed by judges or magistrates: where the magistrate fails to
perform his or her functions in a neutral or detached manner, or where a warrant
152 See Stone, 428 U.S. 465.
153 See Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.
154 See Janis, 428 U.S. 433.
155 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978) (establishing the standing requirement to invoke who can challenge the introduction of
what evidence).
156 Leon, 468 U.S. at 910 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
157 Id. at 910-11 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
158 Id. at 913-14.
159 Id. at 914-15; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (noting that a court may ratify
a warrant even though it is void of probable cause); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,
326-27 (1979) (noting that a court may inquire into a magistrate's failure to remain neutral and
detached); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (noting that a court has the power to inquire
into situations involving the reckless falsity of an affidavit).
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is simply issued based on a bare bones affidavit.' 60 The Court found that reli-
ance on the exclusionary rule in these circumstances is misplaced. The Court
then held that "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates."' 6' Thus, the fact that
the police secured a warrant in Leon - admittedly a defective one - was impor-
tant in the Court's analysis of the value of the exclusionary rule in this case.
The exclusionary rule's primary purpose is to deter police misconduct,
and the Court could not conclude that excluding evidence obtained using an
invalid warrant would deter magistrates or judges from misconduct or lack of
care in issuing warrants. 162 Given that judges "have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions ... the threat of exclusion cannot be expected
significantly to deter them."'' 63 The Court could not conclude that finding the
exclusionary rule inapplicable to cases of judicial misconduct would "reduce
judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment,
encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable
warrant requests."' 164
Thus, the Court held that exclusion was not warranted where the police
act in good faith and the issuing magistrate fails to uphold his or her duty. Spe-
cifically, the Court held, "suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a war-
rant should be ordered ... only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will
further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.' 65 In cases where a judge erred in
issuing a warrant, the Court determined that exclusion of evidence "will not
further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is pain-
fully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and
should act in similar circumstances.' 6 6 In short, the Court's analysis of the
exclusionary rule was summarized when it held that, "penalizing the officer for
the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.' 67
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
According to Leon, evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant later
declared invalid may be introduced in a criminal trial, if a reasonable well-
160 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-16 (1984).
161 Id. at 916.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 917.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 918.
166 Id. at 919-20.
167 Id. at 921.
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trained officer would have believed that the warrant was valid. This has come
to be known as the "good faith exception." However, in adopting the good faith
exception, the Court set out parameters in defining its standard of reasonable-
ness and exactly when the good faith exception applies.
A. The "Objectively Reasonable" Good Faith Requirement
The Court emphasized that the standard of reasonableness adopted to
test the officer's reasonable good faith is an objective one. 168 The inquiry into
good faith is limited to the objectively ascertainable question of whether a rea-
sonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite
the magistrate's authorization.169 While many of the objections to a good faith
exception "assume that the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of
individual officers,"'7 ° the Court's analysis in Leon disposed of this assump-
tion. 1 7 1 Evidence is not admissible merely on a finding that the individual offi-
cer(s) involved in the search honestly believed that the warrant the officer was
executing was valid. 72 Clarifying that the officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable cause determination and the technical sufficiency of the warrant must
be objectively reasonable, the Court noted, "it is clear that in some circum-
stances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the war-
rant was properly issued.' 73 The Court determined that all the circumstances
surrounding the application for the warrant and the search itself may be consid-
ered in the inquiry of the officer's objective reasonableness, including "whether
the warrant had previously been rejected by a different magistrate.' 74
Undoubtedly, the Court utilized previous search and seizure cases to
identify its objective standard of reasonable good faith. 175  "Grounding the
modification in objective reasonableness . . . retains the value of the exclusion-
ary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to con-
duct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment.' '176 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that the objective standard requires "officers to have a reasonable
168 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.20 (1984).
169 Id. at 919-21.
170 Id. at 919 n.20.
171 Id. at 920-22.
172 Id. at 919-22.
173 Id. at 922-23.
174 Id. at 922 n.23.
175 Id. at 922; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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knowledge of what the law prohibits.' '177 Despite the Court's attempt to avoid
unnecessary excursions "into the minds of police officers [which] would pro-
duce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources,' 78 the Court did
suggest that a subjective bad faith may be an appropriate line of inquiry at a
suppression hearing. 179 Indeed, the Court may apply a subjective standard in
those isolated cases where the executing officers subjectively understand that
the warrant they are serving is invalid, even though a typical, "reasonable pru-
dent officer" would not have known the warrant was invalid.
B. Inapplicability of the Good Faith Exception
Mindful of its previous emphasis of the exclusionary rule's deterrent
purposes, the Court defended the good faith exception, noting that the Fourth
Amendment violations in Leon were premised on judicial error, rather than er-
rors by police. 180 This reasoning led the Court to name when and where a good
faith argument will be effective and appropriate. Although Leon represents an
exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court discussed five instances in which
claims of good faith would be inapplicable. 181 In addition to these situations
detailed by the Court, the good faith exception does not apply in searches con-
ducted without a warrant, nor does it cover improperly executed warrants.
1 82
First, the Court concluded suppression would remain an appropriate
remedy "if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by informa-
tion in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was
false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, 183 Second, the Court ruled
that the Leon good faith exception would not apply if the magistrate failed to
abide by his or her neutrality requirement such that a reasonable officer would
have realized that the magistrate was failing to perform his or her duty in such a
manner. 184 Particularly, evidence is properly excluded if the "issuing magistrate
wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York. '  Third, the Court determined that an officer cannot rely on a
177 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.20 (1984) (citing United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
178 Id. at 922 n.23 (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
179 Id. at 921-23.
180 Id. at 921.
181 Id. at 923.
182 Id. at 923-24.
183 Id. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
184 Id. at 923.
185 Id.; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). The Court in Lo-Ji Sales found
that the magistrate violated his duty to be neutral when the magistrate accompanied the police to
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warrant issued in good faith by a magistrate based on a bare bones affidavit. 186
Fourth, the Leon good faith exception would not pertain where a warrant is "so
facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to
be valid. 1 87 A reasonable officer may not, in good faith, rely upon a warrant
that fails to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized -
both Fourth Amendment requirements for a search warrant. 188 Lastly, the Su-
preme Court held that the good faith exception is not applicable where the affi-
davit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable.' 89
In adopting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and apply-
ing it to the facts of Leon, the Court determined that none of the circumstances
listed above were present. Thus, the Court determined that:
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned
his detached and neutral role, 190 in the absence of reckless or
dishonest preparation of the affidavit by the officer, in the pres-
ence of a warrant application supported by much more than a
"bare bones" affidavit,'19 and where there was at least sufficient
evidence to create some disagreement as to the existence of
probable cause,' 92 the officers reliance on the magistrate's de-
termination of probable cause was objectively reasonable. 193
In such circumstances as these, the Court held that the "application of the ex-
treme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate."'
' 94
an adult bookstore and, with the police, selected the materials to be seized.
186 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24 (1984) ("Nothing in our opinion suggests, for
example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a 'bare bones' affidavit and then
rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to
conduct the search."); see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
187 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
188 In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), a companion case to Leon, the Court
allowed the evidence to be introduced despite the fact the warrant was invalid on particularity
grounds. In Sheppard, the magistrate failed to cross out irrelevant portions of the warrant applica-
tion but assured the officer applying for and executing the warrant that the warrant was properly
filed. Id. at 986. The Court held that the officer's reliance on the magistrate's assurances that the
warrant was proper was reasonable. Id. at 990.
189 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)).
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C. Justice Brennan's Dissent: The Dangers of the Good Faith Exception'95
Justice Brennan, in a dissent encompassing the Court's findings in Leon
and Sheppard, complained of the Court's "gradual but determined strangulation
of the [exclusionary] rule' 196 and criticized the Court's application of a cost
benefit analysis. Justice Brennan declared that the Court's assessment of the
costs of excluding illegally obtained evidence were "exaggerated"' 97 and found
the benefits of exclusion were "made to disappear with a mere wave of the
hand."' 98 Also, Justice Brennan posited that the application of the good faith
exception would have undue and unconstructive influence on the judicial integ-
rity rationale behind the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. 199 "In-
deed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of
what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the
[Fourth] Amendment. 200
In addition, Justice Brennan stressed how the application of the good
faith exception would adulterate Fourth Amendment protections.20 ' First, as-
suming that the threat of the exclusionary rule prompts police officers to provide
sufficient information to establish probable cause in retaining a warrant and to
pay close attention to the form of the warrant, Justice Brennan contended such
"institutional incentive" to "err on the side of constitutional behavior" is now
lost by the Court's newly adopted "reasonable mistake" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.202
195 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-60 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by
Marshall, J.).
196 Id. at 928; see, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 433 U.S. 31, 41 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
197 Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 Id. Justice Brennan stated: "The Court seeks to justify this result on the ground that the
'costs' of adhering to the exclusionary rule in cases like those before us exceed the 'benefits.' But
the language of deterrence and of cost/benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can have a nar-
cotic effect." Id. Justice Brennan concluded the Court had embellished the facts of Leon in its
cost benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule, because, in fact, sufficient evidence to allow the
charges to go to trial were not excluded. Id.
199 Id. at 933; see 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 195.
200 Leon, 468 U.S. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 955-58. Indeed, Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, emphasized that if the good
faith exception "results in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we
shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here." Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see also 1 HALL, supra note 8, at 195.
202 Leon, 468 U.S. at 955.
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Justice Brennan's "chief' concern was the insulation of subsequent ju-
dicial review of magistrates' decisions to issue warrants. 0 3 In fact, Justice
Brennan maintained that a magistrate's determination of probable cause in the
issuance of a warrant is now, after Leon, an "inconsequential chore., 20
Creation of this new exception for good-faith reliance upon a
warrant implicitly tells magistrates that they need not take much
care in reviewing warrant applications, since their mistakes will
from now on have virtually no consequence: If their decision to
issue a warrant was correct, the evidence will be admitted; if
their decision was incorrect but the police relied in good faith
on the warrant, the evidence will also be admitted.0 5
Moreover, Justice Brennan feared that the good faith exception would
ultimately undermine the integrity of the warrant process. The dissent notes that
the good faith exception would eradicate police officer's incentive to establish
probable cause adequately because now "the police need only show that it was
not 'entirely unreasonable' under the circumstances of a particular case for them
to believe that the warrant they were issued was valid. 20 6 In truth, according to
Brennan, "all police conduct pursuant" to a secured warrant under circum-
stances once determined reasonable "will be protected from further judicial re-
view." 20
7
Lastly, the dissent could not justify the Court's decision based on the
Court's belief "that police are hobbled by inflexible and hypertechnical warrant
procedures .... ,208 Justice Brennan determined that "the relaxed standard for
assessing probable cause '2 9 established in Illinois v. Gates,21 ° rendered the
Court's good faith exception practically futile because a Court could not practi-
cally find a warrant invalid under the Gates standard, yet objectively reasonable
under the Leon test.2 1 The concerns and consequences of the good faith excep-
tion chronicled by Justice Brennan have indubitably been grounds on which
many states and federal circuits have rejected the Court's reasoning and estab-
lishment of the good faith exception.
203 Id. at 956.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 957-58.
207 Id. at 957.
208 Id. at 958.
209 Id.
210 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
211 Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S POST-LEON APPLICATION OF THE LEON GOOD
FAITH ANALYSIS
Despite numerous changes in the Court's makeup, the Supreme Court
has generally followed Leon, and there is no indication that the Court intends to
limit Leon's application. The Supreme Court has extended the good faith
exception to a non-warrant search and applied many of Leon's principles to
sustain erroneous arrests as a result of technically invalid warrants. 21 2 Indeed,
the Court is inclined to follow Leon where the presence of an intermediary's
error, be it a judicial officer, a court employee, or even a state's legislator,
proceeds to invalidate a warrant reasonably relied upon in good faith by a police
officer.213 However, the Court has not addressed whether the good faith
exception applies to warrantless searches by police.
In Arizona v. Evans,2t 4 the Court upheld a warrantless search of defen-
dant's car upon an arrest during a routine traffic stop. The arrest was prompted
by an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for defendant's arrest.215 Although the
arrest warrant had previously been quashed because a court employee erred in
updating records, the defendant's name had not been removed from the com-
puter.216 The majority applied the objective good faith rule of Leon and held
that the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the drugs found during
the warrantless search.2 17 The Court concluded that "[tihere is no indication that
the arresting officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon
the police computer record.
2 18
In Maryland v. Garrison,219 the Court held that a search warrant author-
izing a search of an entire third floor apartment building was valid when issued,
212 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
213 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 4.
216 Id. at 5.
217 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court, with Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
and Justice Kennedy joining. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, as did Justice Souter
and Justice Breyer. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg entered separate dissenting opinions.
218 Id. at 15-16. In applying the Leon good faith exception to the warrantless search, the Court
recognized the historical design of the exclusionary rule as deterring police misconduct, not mis-
takes by court employees. Id. at 14. Second, the Court stated that there was no evidence "that
court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion." Id. at 14-15.
Third, the Court stated "there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in
these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing
police that a warrant has been quashed." Id. at 15.
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because it was reasonable to assume there was only one apartment on the floor.
In Garrison, the police officers applied for a search warrant for a "third-floor
apartment.,0220 Utility records indicated a single bill sent to the third floor at the
particular address. However, upon executing the warrant and after discovering
two kitchens upon the search, the officers realized that they were searching two
apartments. 22 1 The Court, apparently applying the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, held that the warrant was valid until the error was discovered
because "the officers' failure to realize the over breadth of the warrant was ob-
jectively understandable and reasonable. 222
In a third case illustrating the breadth of the Court's willingness to apply
Leon, the Court, in Illinois v. Krull,223 reasoned that suppression of evidence
collected pursuant to a legislatively-mandated warrantless search of automotive
vehicle and parts dealers was unnecessary even though the statute was subse-
quently held to be unconstitutional. In finding Leon controlling, the Court ex-
plained that the exclusionary rule would be ineffective in deterring police offi-
224
cers from reasonably relying on the legislature's commands.
VII. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION IN STATE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
Undoubtedly, state courts adjudicate the majority of constitutional
criminal claims in this country, partly due to the limited criminal jurisdiction of
the federal court system. The United States Supreme Court reviews few search
and seizure cases, leaving for state court systems the greatest development of
search and seizure law. Thus, grounded in the principle that states may impose
greater constitutional protection under state law than does the Federal Constitu-
tion,225 and the Supreme Court's stance that it lacks jurisdiction to review deci-
226sions from state courts based on independent state grounds, critics of the good
faith exception have found haven in state courts excluding evidence based on
exclusionary rules derived from state constitutions. Indeed, numerous states
have construed and applied their exclusionary rule independent of the federal
exclusionary rule. 27 Other states have found that their exclusionary rule must
220 Id. at 81.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 88.
223 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
224 Id. at 349-50. The Court also found that the exclusionary rule could not deter legislators
from passing legislation that violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 351-53.
225 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992
(1983); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
226 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
227 State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing distinguishable exclusionary rule
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be read in conformity with the federal rule22 8 or that they lack an exclusionary
rule distinct from the federal rule.229 As a result, since the inception of the good
faith exception, state courts have tackled the laborious chore of applying the
correct exclusionary rule and determining if the good faith exception is applica-
ble, resulting in diverse and unpredictable consequences. Ironically, the Leon
Court noted that "the good faith exception.., should not be difficult to apply in
practice.230
After concluding that the good faith exception admits evidence, other-
wise inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, where a police officer reasonably
relied on the warrant with objective good faith, the Court "imposed conditions
on the applicability of the good faith exception and failed to explain adequately
several of these conditions.' 23' Indeed, states have interpreted the good faith
exception's applicability in many ways, resulting in inconsistent application of
the exception.
A. Good Faith Exception Adopted and Upheld
Despite immense criticism of the good faith exception, numerous states
have found that the exception is generally applicable to limit state exclusionary
rules derived from state constitutions.232 In State v. Huber,233 the Kansas court,
applying Section 15 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution, adopted the
good faith exception as a matter of state law. In fact, the court noted it was free
from article 1, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution); State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988)
(recognizing distinguishable exclusionary rule from article 1, section 7 of the Connecticut Consti-
tution); State v. Novembrino, 517 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987) (recognizing distinguishable exclusionary
rule from article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution).
228 See State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding the substantive
right to have articles or information obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure excluded
from evidence in state courts must be construed in conformity with the Federal Constitution's
Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court), aff d, 524 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 1988).
229 See Howell v. State, 483 A.2d 780 (Md. 1984) (noting Maryland had no exclusionary rule).
230 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984).
231 Robert C. Gleason, Note, Application Problems Arising from the Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 748-749 (1987). The author lists these
ambiguous conditions imposed on the good faith exception as the "Reasonably Well-Trained
Officer Requirement," the definition of "Objective Good Faith," and the list of "Exceptions to the
Exceptions." Id.
232 See People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1994). Although the Colorado Supreme
Court recognized and adopted the good faith exception, the court found no absence of good faith.
See also Jackson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1987); Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985); Howell, 483 A.2d at 780; State v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1986); Hyde v.
State, 769 P.2d 376 (Wyo. 1989).
233 704 P.2d 1004 (Kan. 1985).
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to retain stricter "pre-Leon" exclusion standards. However, the state supreme
court stance held that the scope of Section 15 was identical to that of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that therefore there was no
234
reason to take a different position regarding the Leon good faith exception.
The good faith exception was also adopted in Indiana in Mers v. State
235
when the court found no compelling reason to reject the exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. The court recognized that the state exclusionary rule236 had his-
torical ties with the federal exclusionary rule, and that Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution contained identical language to that of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 237 A year later, in Stanebow v. State, 23 the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals adopted the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.
B. Good Faith Exception Rejected
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as articulated in Leon,
has been rejected on state law grounds in numerous states.239 Defendants have
relied on state exclusionary rules stemming from state constitutional provisions
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures to counter prosecutorial attempts
to enact and apply a good faith exception. Many states have granted broader
protection under their exclusionary rules by refusing to adopt a good faith ex-
ception under their respective state constitutions. To strike down the adoption
of a good faith exception, state courts have recognized that their state exclusion-
ary rules are independent of the federal exclusionary rule.
Many state courts, in declining to apply the good faith exception, are
heavily influenced by the concern that adoption of a good faith exception would
undermine law enforcement's motivation to carefully comply with all probable
cause requirements in securing a warrant. 240 The Michigan Court of Appeals
234 Id. at 1011.
235 482 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
236 See IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 1, 14.
237 Mers, 482 N.E.2d at 783.
238 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
239 See State v. DeWitt, 910 P.2d 9 (Ariz. 1996); State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990);
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807 (Del. 2000); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); State v.
Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); State v. Prior,
617 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2000); People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State
v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993);
People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 (Wash. 1991).
240 See State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); see also Marsala, 579 A.2d at 58;
Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 807. In Marsala, the court held the good faith exception was not compatible
with the search and seizure provision of the Connecticut Constitution. 579 A.2d at 58. In so
doing, the court was also unwilling to accept Leon's assessment of the social costs of the exclu-
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declined to adopt the good faith exception in People v. Sundling 24 1 holding that
the exclusionary rule was a necessary corollary of the right under the Article 1,
Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The court discussed with approval Justice Brennan's opinion that
the majority lacked sufficient statistics to support the majority's concern regard-
ing substantial social costs resulting from application of the exclusionary rule
where police made an objectively reasonable mistake in applying for and exe-
cuting the warrant.2 42 In State v. Novembrino,2 43 New Jersey also rejected the
good faith exception, focusing on its concern that the good faith exception
would "ultimately reduce respect for and compliance with the probable cause
standard that we have steadfastly enforced. 24 4 In Novembrino, the court held
that "the erosion of the probable-cause guarantee will be a corollary to the good-
faith exception. 245 In State v. Guzman,24 the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the
good faith exception because the good faith exception conflicted with the poli-
cies supporting Idaho's exclusionary rule; the court also disagreed with the Leon
court's balancing test.
247
The Pennsylvania and North Carolina Supreme Courts have rejected the
good faith exception because they felt the exception would undermine the
Fourth Amendment's protection of a right to privacy. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court rejected the good faith exception in 1991 in Commonwealth v. Ed-
munds.248 In Edmunds, the court noted that the protection of an individual's
right to privacy is one of the purposes of the state exclusionary rule, 249 and held
that "an invasion of privacy, in good faith or bad, is equally intrusive., 250 The
North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception in 1988 in State
sionary rule, specifically concerning itself with the potential encouragement some officers may
realize in failing to take care in reviewing warrant applications that such a good faith exception
may incur. Id. at 63-66.
241 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
242 Id. at 314-15.
243 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987).
244 Id. at 854.
245 Id. at 857.
246 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992). Prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's rejection of the good faith
exception, Leon was accepted in State v. Rice, 712 P.2d 686 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). See Jennifer
L. Kauth, Comment, Goodbye Good Faith Doctrine: Constitutional Rights Prevail with the Rejec-
tion of the Leon Good Faith Exception, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 159 (1993).
247 Guzman, 842 P.2d at 671-72.
248 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
249 Id. at 897.
250 Id. at 901.
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v. Carter.251 The Carter court, in addition to arguing that the good faith excep-
tion would interfere with the exclusionary rule's role in preserving judicial in-
tegrity, found that the good faith exception would severely interfere with citi-
zens' constitutional right of privacy.
252
Various other states have rejected the good faith exception only in par-
ticular circumstances, so that evidence seized under such circumstances remains
inadmissible as a matter of state law. In State v. Cardenas,253 the Indiana Su-
preme Court held that the good faith exception to the state exclusionary rule did
not apply to a search of defendant's home for drugs where the search warrant
was a general search warrant and no reasonable person could conclude that such
a warrant was valid.254 In State v. Martin,255 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court denied the state's contention that circumstances mandated a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution because the state's
failure to prove that a bench warrant was valid at the time of defendants arrest
removed the mantle of judicial authorization.256
VIII. WEST VIRGINIA: A LEON, GOOD FAITH STATE OR NOT?
A. Historical Analysis of West Virginia Search and Seizure Law
The West Virginia Constitution states:
The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, person,
papers and affects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue except upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be
seized.257
The West Virginia Supreme Court has held that this section protects an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.25 8 "As an absolute minimum,
the Fourth Amendment demands that a criminal defendant's private papers, in
251 370 A.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988).
252 Id. at 559.
253 686 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. 1997).
254 Id.
255 761 A.2d 516 (N.H. 2000).
256 Id.
257 W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 6.
258 State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981). "The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and Article III, Section 6, of the West Virginia Constitution protect an indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
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which there has been found to exist a reasonable expectation of privacy, cannot
be seized by law enforcement officials in the absence of a valid warrant issued
upon probable cause., 259 The court also has recognized this section's similarity
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and it traditionally
construes this section in accord with the Fourth Amendment.26° Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has held that the provisions of the West Virginia Constitution relat-
ing to unreasonable searches and seizures "should be given a construction in
harmony with the construction of the federal provisions by the Supreme Court
of the United States."26'
However, while acknowledging the Leon good faith exception, the West
Virginia Supreme Court has not indicated whether West Virginia has adopted a
good faith exception to the state exclusionary rule. In State v. Schofield, the
court discussed with approval the decisions in Leon and Sheppard. In State v.
Adkins,263 the court noted that Leon did not apply. In State v. Worley,26 the
court neglected to adopt or reject the good faith exception as a matter of law.
B. The Exclusionary Rule, the Warrant, and the Requirements of a Valid
Affidavit in West Virginia
There is little doubt that, under the common law, the manner in which
evidence was obtained did not affect its admissibility at trial.2 65 It was not until
1961 that the United States Supreme Court held that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in
266state court. 6 However, as early as 1921, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures
267
was inadmissible in West Virginia courts. The West Virginia Supreme Court
has clearly evidenced its strong preference that searches be conducted pursuant
to a search warrant.268 Consequently, a warrantless search may be deemed un-
reasonable and the fruits of the search inadmissible pursuant to the state exclu-
259 Syl. Pt. 5, Marano v. Holland, 366 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. 1981).
260 State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1973).
261 Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Andrews, 114 S.E. 257 (W. Va. 1922); see State v. Massie, 120 S.E. 514
(W. Va. 1923).
262 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
263 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986).
264 369 S.E.2d 706, 713 n.7 (W. Va. 1988).
265 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d 50, 53 (W.
Va. 1980).
266 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
267 Syl. Pts. 7 & 8, State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1922).
268 Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Cain, 289 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1982).
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sionary rule.2 69 The West Virginia Supreme Court has determined that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or mag-
istrate, are per se unreasonable . . . - subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions., 270 For example, "[t]he exclusionary rule
has no application when the state learns from an independent source about the
evidence sought to be suppressed., 271 Acknowledging that the Fourth Amend-
ment and the West Virginia Constitution prohibit only unreasonable searches,
the court has determined that, "unless the warrantless search comes within a
recognized exception, it is unreasonable and therefore illegal. 272
In State v. Slat,2 73 the Court determined that, before evidence secured
through a warrant could be admitted in a criminal prosecution, "it is incumbent
upon the prosecution to show that the search and seizure warrant was valid. 274
Before a warrant may be validly issued, a showing of probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation must be established before a judicial tribunal.275 In State
269 Id. In State v. Bruner, 105 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1958), the court held that only unreasonable
searches are condemned by the Federal and West Virginia Constitutions.
270 State v. Tadder, 313 S.E.2d 667, 670 (W. Va. 1984) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Moore, 272
S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1980)). Exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be "jealously and care-
fully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative." Id.
271 Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Aldridge, 304 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1983). Indeed, the exclusionary rule
has no application where the evidence introduced has an "independent source," where the rela-
tionship between the unconstitutional police misconduct and the discovery of the evidence is "so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the illegality, and where the evidence would nevertheless
have been "inevitably discovered." State v. Davis, 345 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1986).
272 Moore, 272 S.E.2d at 808 n.3. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has acknowl-
edged numerous situations in which a warrant is not required. In Syllabus Point I of State v.
Angel, 177 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1970), the court found searches of an automobile, searches made
in hot pursuit, searches around an area where an arrest is made, searches of things that are obvious
to the senses, searches of abandoned property, and searches that been consented to do not require
a warrant. See also State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1973). "Where a person voluntar-
ily and knowingly consents to a search of a premises, such a search may be conducted in the ab-
sence of a search warrant." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Hambrick, 350 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1986). An
officer may conduct a search for concealed weapons without a warrant where the officer makes a
lawful investigatory stop and has reason to believe an individual is armed and dangerous. Syl. Pt.
3, State v. Choat, 363 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1987). A warrant is not required where the evidence is
fully disclosed and open to the senses. State v. Thomas, 143 S.E. 88, 89-90 (W. Va. 1928). "A
search of an automobile may be conducted without a warrant where the police have probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime and where exigent
circumstances prevent the obtainment of a warrant." Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Moore, 272 S.E.2d 804
(W. Va. 1980).
273 127 S.E. 191 (W. Va. 1925)
274 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
275 Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1993); State v. White, 280 S.E.2d 114
(W. Va. 1981); State ex rel. Lewis v. Warth, 48 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1948).
[Vol. 105
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v. Adkins,276 the court adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test developed
in Illinois v. Gates277 to determine the existence of probable cause.
The court concluded in Syllabus Point 4 of Adkins:
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, the
validity of an affidavit for a search warrant is to be judged by
the totality of the information contained in it. Under this rule, a
conclusory affidavit is not acceptable nor is an affidavit based
on hearsay acceptable unless there is a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay set out in the affidavit which can include
the corroborative efforts of police officers.278
Further, the court in State v. Hlavacek279 held:
To constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search war-
rant, the affiant must set forth facts indicating the existence of
criminal activities which would justify a search and further, if
there is an unnamed informant, sufficient facts must be set forth
demonstrating that the information obtained from the unnamed
informant is reliable.28°
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not adopted the
Aguilar-Spinelli test to determine whether the affidavit for a search warrant is
factually sufficient to supply probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.28'
In State v. Lilly,282 the court described circumstances in which a magistrate may
find probable cause:
Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant exists if the
facts and circumstances provided to a magistrate in a written af-
fidavit are sufficient to warrant the belief of a prudent person of
reasonable caution that a crime has been committed and that the
specific fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband from that crime
presently may be found at a specific location. It is not enough
276 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986).
277 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
278 Adkins, 346 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 4.
279 407 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1991).
280 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5; Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1980).
281 In fact, only one case even discussed this issue after the Aguilar-Spinelli test was estab-
lished. See State v. Dudick, 213 S.E.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975).
282 461 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1995).
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that a magistrate believes a crime has been committed. The
magistrate also must have a reasonable belief that the place or
person to be searched will yield certain specific classes of
items. There must be a nexus between the criminal activity and
the place or person searched and thing seized. The probable
cause determination does not depend solely upon individual
facts; rather, it depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in
the totality of circumstances. 283
However, a successful attack of a search warrant affidavit will void the
search warrant and render evidence seized under the warrant inadmissible.284 In
Lilly, the court offered guidance concerning how to formulate a successful at-
tack.
To successfully challenge the validity of a search warrant on the
basis of false information in the warrant affidavit, the defendant
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the affi-
ant, either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disre-
gard for the truth, included a false statement therein. The same
analysis applies to omissions of fact. The defendant must show
that the facts were intentionally omitted or were omitted in
reckless disregard of whether their omission made the affidavit
misleading.285
A warrant containing a misrepresentation by the police officer may still
be found valid.286 "A search warrant affidavit is not invalid even if it contains a
misrepresentation, if, after striking the misrepresentation, there remains suffi-
,,287cient content to support a finding of probable cause. However, a search con-
ducted upon a warrant lacking in probable cause or void of other necessary re-
quirements288 is generally unreasonable and unlawful, thereby rendering evi-
283 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
284 Hlavacek, 407 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 3; Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Thompson, 358 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va.
1987); Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Walls, 294 S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 1982).
285 Lilly, 461 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 1.
286 Id.
287 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
288
There are three requirements for a valid search warrant: (1) jurisdictional con-
trol over the person or property to be searched; (2) showing of probable cause
where a right of privacy exists and the probable cause must be established un-
der oath. State v. White, 280 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1981); and (3) the warrant to
search must indicate with particularity the place to be searched and the items
to be seized during the search.
[Vol. 105
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dence obtained from such warrant inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary
rule.
C. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' Treatment of United
States v. Leon
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly
referred to Leon and analyzed the good faith exception in numerous cases and
under variable circumstances, it has refused to expressly adopt or reject the ex-
ception. In discussing the Leon good faith exception, the court has focused on
the circumstances in which the Leon Court stated the good faith exception
would not be applicable. 289 As a result, the court has repeatedly determined that
the circumstances surrounding a search warrant met one of the exceptions to the
good faith exception and thus, that the good faith exception did not apply.
One year after the Supreme Court's establishment of the good faith ex-
ception, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed Leon in State v.
Schofield.290 The court noted that determining whether the facts of that case
would come within the good faith exception would be "problematic., 291 How-
ever, the court did not reach that issue because it determined that a warrantless
arrest was justified.292 In Schofield, the court followed the circuit court, holding
that the arrest warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest;
nonetheless, the court determined that the defendant's arrest was valid because,
under the circumstances, an arrest warrant was not required.293 Despite this
finding, the court approvingly discussed the Leon good faith exception, noting
that the good faith defense does not apply to facially defective warrants.294 Fur-
thermore, in analyzing the facts in Schofield, the court found that the "magistrate
1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 354. The state constitution requires that a warrant particularly de-
scribe the thing to be seized and general warrants are not adequate. State ex rel. White v. Melton,
273 S.E.2d 81, 83 (W. Va. 1980). In West Virginia, section 62-1A-I provides that
a search warrant authorized by this article may be issued by a judge of a court
having jurisdiction to try criminal cases in the county, or by a justice of a
county, or by the mayor or judge of the police court of the municipality
wherein the property sought is located.
W. VA. CODE § 62-lA-1 (2000).
289 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984); supra notes 155-61 and accompa-
nying text; see also Hlavacek, 407 S.E.2d at 383 n.5; State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762, 774-75 (W.
Va. 1986).
290 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
291 Id. at 835.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 834.
294 Id. at 835.
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who issued the warrant was not misled by its admittedly scanty contents nor did
the affiant believe his information was false.,
295
In three cases involving the sufficiency of a warrant affidavit, the court
declined to apply the Leon good faith exception because it characterized the
content of the affidavit as "bare bones;" and therefore, unable to be salvaged by
the exception. In State v. Adkins,2 96 the court held that the probable cause affida-
vit was insufficient to establish probable cause or to justify police officers' reli-
ance on the warrant. The defendant, appealing his felony conviction of posses-
sion with intent to deliver a controlled substance, contended that evidence intro-
duced at trial was obtained with an invalid search warrant because the warrant
failed to establish probable cause.29 7 An investigator for the City of Clarksburg
and a sergeant of the Harrison County Sheriff's Department presented a sworn
affidavit for a search warrant to a Harrison County magistrate in which they
alleged that the defendant possessed, with intent to deliver, marijuana. 98
In response to the defendant's charge that the search warrant affidavit
failed to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the state
relied heavily on Illinois v. Gates.299 In evaluating the probable cause challenge,
the court traced the development of the major United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with the sufficiency of information contained in a search warrant
affidavit. 300 Indeed, in examining West Virginia case law, the court recognized
that "our search and seizure cases which involve the question of whether the
affidavit for the search warrant is sufficient factually to supply probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant are not very illuminating., 30' However, the court
295 Id.
296 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986).
297 Id. at 764.
298 Id. The basis of the officers' belief for obtaining the search warrant derived from a confi-
dential informant who observed marijuana in the possession of the defendant in the defendant's
home. Id.
299 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the two-prong
test established by Aguilar and Spinelli and adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test in order
to determine the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant. See Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The United States Supreme Court sum-
marized the two-prong test in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 730 (1984). Prior to Gates,
the Fourth Amendment was understood by many courts to require strict satisfaction of a "two-
pronged test" whenever an affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant relies on an in-
formant's tip. It was thought that the affidavit, first, must establish the "basis of knowledge" of
the informant-the particular means by which he came by the information given in his report;
and, second, that it must provide facts establishing either the general "veracity" of the informant
or the specific "reliability" of his report in the particular case.
300 Adkins, 346 S.E.2d at 769-72.
301 Id. at 772. The court acknowledged that several of its cases settled the sufficiency question
by citing Syllabus Point I of State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1980), which states:
To constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the affiant
[Vol. 105
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ultimately concluded that the "liberalization occasioned by the totality rule de-
veloped in Gates' '3°2 subsumed the outstanding questions involving the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit to supply probable cause in West Virginia jurisprudence.
Thus, the court held that, "under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, the
validity of an affidavit for a search warrant is to be judged by the totality of the
information contained in it. ' ° 3 Pursuant to the facts set forth as applied to this
rule, the court concluded, "the warrant affidavit is defective under the Gates'
'totality rule.'
304
After finding the warrant affidavit defective, the court discussed the
Leon good faith exception rather exhaustively. 30 5 The court acknowledged the
principles described by the United States Supreme Court in adopting the excep-
tion and specifically noted the situations in which the good faith exception
would not be applicable. 306 The court found that, regardless of the applicability
of Leon, the affidavit in question was "so conclusory with regard to its probable
cause information as to render it a 'bare bones' affidavit." 307 The court con-
cluded, per Leon, a bare bones affidavit was "not subject to rehabilitation by the
good faith exception" and refused to apply the exception. 0 8 Again, the court
did not adopt or reject the Leon good faith exception. Justice Cleckley, in his
comprehensive Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure, noted, "[I]n
his otherwise excellent opinion, Chief Justice Miller strikes a sour note to the
Bench and Bar by the failure to declare the law in West Virginia. 310
must set forth facts indicating the existence of criminal activities which would
justify a search and further, if there is an unnamed informant, sufficient facts
must be set forth demonstrating that the information obtained from the un-
named informant is reliable.
302 Adkins, 346 S.E.2d at 773.
303 Id. Under this rule, the court also concluded "a conclusory affidavit is not acceptable nor is
an affidavit based on hearsay acceptable unless there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay
set out in the affidavit which can include the corroborative efforts of police officers." Id. at 773-
74.
304 Id. at 774.
305 See id. at 774-75.
306 Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). These situations include: where the magistrate was mis-
led by information provided by the affiant in the affidavit the affiant knew was false, where the
magistrate abandons his judicial role, where the affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that belief
in its existence is unreasonable, where the warrant is deficient in particularizing the scope of the
search, and where the affidavit is no more than a bare bones affidavit. Id.
307 Adkins, 346 S.E.2d at 775.
308 Id.
309 See id. n.20 ("Because we find that the affidavit does not meet the Leon good faith excep-
tion, we do not decide the issue of whether we would adopt this rule into our jurisprudence.").
310 See 1 CLECKLEY, supra note 1, at 228 (referring to the court's failure to expressly reject or
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Presented the opportunity to expressly adopt or reject the Leon good
faith exception six years after Adkins, the court, relying on Adkins, refused to
apply the good faith exception and again failed to expressly adopt or reject the
exception. In State v. Hlavacek,31' the court was presented with the issue of
whether the good faith exception should salvage a defective warrant. In
Hlavacek, the defendant appealed his conviction of one felony count of posses-
sion of marijuana with the intent to deliver. 312 Specifically, the defendant chal-
lenged the validity of the search warrant that was obtained by the police after his
arrest and the admissibility of the evidence discovered pursuant to the search
warrant. 313 The relevant facts demonstrated that an officer met with an infor-
mant who advised the officer of the defendant's impending drug run that day.314
Based on this information, the officer followed the defendant and ultimately
approached him and attempted to get consent to a search of his automobile.3 5
The defendant failed to give consent and the officer proceeded to obtain a search
warrant of the automobile.31 6 Meanwhile, the officer conducted a protective
search of the defendant's person and discovered three marijuana cigarettes. 317 In
the search of the vehicle pursuant to the warrant, the police discovered approxi-
mately one pound of marijuana.3 18
The court determined that the affidavit presented to the magistrate was
"insufficient for several reasons." 319 In response, the state advanced several
theories to "save" the warrant. 32  Specifically, the state argued that the "defec-tive warrant should by salvaged by applying the 'good faith' exception., 321 Not-
adopt the good faith exception).
311 407 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1991).
312 Id. at 378.
313 Id. In appealing his conviction, the defendant also challenged the search of his person prior
to the arrest. Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held the circumstances did not
reasonably warrant the officer's belief that his safety was in jeopardy, the breadth of the frisk was






319 Id. at 382. First, the court determined that the "factual basis for this affidavit was built
almost exclusively upon the conclusory statements of an undisclosed confidential informant"
where the judicial officer had no means to evaluate the informant's credibility. Id. Second, the
court found "the affidavit is devoid of any information attesting to the veracity of its 'confidential
informant source."' Id.
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ing circumstances in which the good faith exception is inapplicable, and explic-
itly referencing Leon's holding that a bare bones affidavit could not survive ju-
dicial scrutiny by relying upon the good faith exception, the court, as it did in
Adkins, found that, because the search warrant was based on a bare bones affi-
davit, it could not be "redeemed through resort to this exception." 3
22
In State v. Worley,323 the court rejected the prosecution's suggestion that
a warrant lacking probable cause was salvageable by application of the good
faith exception.324 The court first acknowledged that "a conclusory affidavit is
not acceptable nor is an affidavit based on hearsay acceptable unless there is a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay set out in the affidavit which can in-
clude the corroborative efforts of police officers., 325 The court then noted that
the affidavit failed to reveal new information that would provide any basis for
substantiating the general hearsay statements in the affidavit. 326 The court con-
sidered it a "bare bones affidavit of the type specifically rejected in Adkins. '327
As it observed in Adkins, the court concluded that the warrant affidavit was "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable. '" 328 The court did not expressly adopt or reject the good
faith exception in Worley, but it suggested that the good faith exception may be
applicable where an affiant possesses a reasonable belief that probable cause is
present.
In State v. Thompson,329 the prosecution attempted to fit the conduct of
the officers within the good faith exception. The court first acknowledged that
the application of the good faith exception is inappropriate where the magistrate
issuing the warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his disregard for the
truth.330 It then held that the officer's assertion that his informant was reliable
"showed at least a reckless disregard for the truth if not an intentional misrepre-
sentation. 331 Although it once again declined to adopt or reject the good faith
exception, in dicta, it provided hints concerning a situation where Leon could
apply. It held, "Leon protects police work and evidence obtained from being
322 Id.
323 369 S.E.2d 706 (W. Va. 1988).
324 Id. at 713 n.7.
325 Id. at 712-13 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986)).
326 Id. at 713.
327 Id. at 713.
328 Id. at 713 n.7 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).
329 358 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1987).
330 Id. at 819; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
331 Thompson, 358 S.E.2d at 819.
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excluded because of error beyond the control of investigating officers." 332 In-
deed, Thompson seems to suggest, in dicta, that Leon applies in West Virginia.
The fact that this is dictum may reduce its significance, but its importance may
be greater than commentators have suggested.
The court has also declined to discuss Leon's applicability in West
Virginia in cases where it has found the challenged search warrant sufficient and
valid. In State v. Haught,333 the court refused to address the good faith excep-
tion because it found the description of the place to be searched "sufficiently
detailed so as to allow the law enforcement officers to locate the house to be
searched with reasonable probability and certainty that they would not search
,,334the wrong premises.
Most recently, in State v. Lilly,335 the court refused to address the prose-
cution's reliance on the good faith exception to overcome the court's finding
that the search warrant was invalidly obtained. Holding that the "issuance of the
search warrant was not supported by probable cause," the court found two
grounds for refusing to address the good faith exception. 336 First, the court
found the affidavit failed to establish probable cause and was "bare bones and
conclusory., 337 Second, the court found the prosecution failed to argue the issue
of the good faith exception in its brief.
338
In summation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has dodged
the question of whether West Virginia recognizes the Leon good faith exception
as a matter of state law. By concluding that the good faith exception was inap-
plicable in each of the situations in which the good faith exception was at issue,
the court has deemed it unnecessary to expressly adopt or reject the Leon good
faith exception.
332 Id.
333 371 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1988).
334 Id. at 64 n.9
335 461 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1995).
336 Id. at 111.
337 Id. at n.16 ("The 'good faith' exception does not apply to circumstances where the warrant
is based on an affidavit so lacking in probable cause at to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable."); see also State v. Hlavacek, 407 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1991); State v. Ad-
kins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1985).
338 Lilly, 461 S.E.2d at 111 n. 16 ("[A]ppellate courts frequently refuse to address issues that
appellants, or in this case the appellee, fail to develop in their brief. In fact, the issue of 'good
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D. Arguments Against and in Support of West Virginia's Adoption and
Recognition of the Good Faith Exception
It may not be possible to predict whether the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals will adopt or reject the Leon good faith exception when pre-
sented with circumstances requiring it to resolve the issue. However, the court
will undoubtedly be persuaded by its own previous discussions of the exclusion-
ary rule and the good faith exception, as well as the stance other states have
taken in adopting or rejecting the exception.
The court could follow the lead of many states and acknowledge its his-
tory of interpreting its relevant state constitutional provisions in harmony with
the construction of the Fourth Amendment 339 as its basis for adopting the good
faith exception. The court has adopted the rather controversial Gates "totality of
the circumstances test" in determining the existence of probable cause, 340 evi-
dencing its willingness to construct state search and seizure law in conformity
with the United States Supreme Court. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has never expressly declared the purposes and goals of the exclusionary
rule in West Virginia. In adopting the good faith exception, the court would
have to accept the rationale employed by the United States Supreme Court in
analyzing the purposes and effects of the exclusionary rule, as well as the
Court's cost-benefit analysis of the good faith exception. Concluding that the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, as the
Supreme Court did in Leon, would entail a major evolutionary step in the court's
analysis of the state exclusionary rule. The court will most likely be willing to
entertain the adoption of the good faith exception where the police officers are
performing their duties in complete good faith. In State v. Thompson,341 the
court suggested that Leon may apply where the error is completely beyond the
control of the police officers obtaining the warrant.342
Surprisingly, the court has also not taken the opportunity to criticize the
rationale employed by the Court in Leon. The court could rely on any number
of grounds in rejecting the good faith exception. Indeed, states rejecting the
good faith exception have created abundant justifications for their holdings,
including the exclusionary rule's deprivation of citizens' protections guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and reciprocal
provisions in state constitutions. As discussed beforehand, many states have
rejected the good faith exception on state constitutional grounds to combat the
decreased federal protection under the exclusionary rule Leon created. The op-
339 See State v. Massie, 120 S.E. 514 (W. Va. 1923); Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Andrews, 114 S.E. 257
(W. Va. 1922).
340 See Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Thompson, 421 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1992); Adkins, 246 S.E.2d at Syl.
Pt. 4.
341 358 S.E.2d at 815.
342 Id. at 819.
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ponents argue that the good faith exception undermines the goals of the Fourth
Amendment protections against illegal searches and seizures by admitting evi-
dence illegally seized based solely on a mistake committed by the judiciary.
Exclusionary rule opponents reject the premise underlying Leon that the exclu-
sionary rule was solely meant to deter police misconduct. They argue that the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to guarantee constitutional rights
afforded citizens. The rejection of the good faith exception, it is argued, further
protects one's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the United States of America and the West Virginia
Constitution guarantee certain rights protecting citizens from the government.
One of those rights is the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
turn, courts have created numerous exceptions to these rights. Specifically, in
United States v. Leon,343 the United States Supreme Court created the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. However, numerous states, concerned with
the potential diminishment of Fourth Amendment protections and the dilution of
the well-received exclusionary rule, have rejected the good faith exception.
Despite numerous opportunities to discuss or criticize the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Leon, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has declined to expressly address the exception. Instead, it has found all poten-
tial "good faith cases" inapplicable pursuant to the exceptional circumstances
described in Leon. The court's reluctance to expressly adopt or reject the excep-
tion may be reasonable considering the pervasive ramifications an adoption or
rejection of such an exception may entail. However, this reluctance makes pre-
dicting whether the court will adopt or reject the good faith exception extremely
difficult. The court's reluctance to address this issue produces potential prob-
lems for defendants and prosecutors alike. Defendants and prosecutors are in a
quandary as to the court's treatment of a questionable warrant where the police
assert good faith. Moreover, an express adoption or rejection of the exception
could prevent the expense of significant resources in the lower courts. Just as
Justice Cleckley eloquently enunciated in his Handbook on West Virginia
Criminal Procedure, the court should squarely and expressly address the issue
as soon as the appropriate case and controversy arises. In doing so, I also rec-
ommend that the court provide a detailed analysis of the exclusionary rule in
West Virginia jurisprudence, including its adoption, its history, and its purposes
as interpreted by the court.
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